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Under these circumstances mutual tolerance between the majority of Jews and the majority of Gentiles—a tolerance based upon a thorough understanding of each other's point of view—would seem an ideal scarcely possible of realization.

But apart from this general cause there are certain special causes of friction which the author enumerates. These are, upon the Jewish side, the expression of superiority and a reliance upon secrecy; upon our side, an equal expression of superiority and a deep-rooted disingenuousness in our attitude toward and dealing with the Jew.

The remedies proposed are of an extremely general nature. The first is "the determination to speak of the Jewish people as openly, as continuously, with as much interest, with as close an examination, as we speak of any other foreign body with which we are brought in contact". The second is "to avoid in the individual public recognition of those with whom we must live, all futile anger and all mere reaction".

All this is perhaps as good general advice as can be given; yet it implies a counsel of perfection. We are to get rid of intolerance by not permitting ourselves to be intolerant. At the same time we are to cultivate frankness; we are not to prepare the materials for an explosion by repressing our real dislikes or aversions through fear or any other motive. The author is especially insistent upon this point. "The suppression of resentment, though that suppression is the act of the men who themselves feel the resentment and not directly of their opponents, is a fierce irritant and accounts for the high pressure at which the attack escapes when once it is loosened." But this last-mentioned recommendation does not make the problem any easier; on the contrary it makes it harder. It is, on the whole, more reasonable to expect that a person will learn tolerance than that, while feeling intolerance and resentment, he will acquire the mentality to give these feelings a just and measured expression.

There is, then, no panacea, no real programme. We are left simply with certain rather obvious moral principles. But Mr. Belloc's book, by virtue of its frankness, its clear statement of facts that are frequently blinked, its accurate appreciation of difficulties and of differing points of view, should make the application of these principles somewhat easier. In this view, it seems that the book might have been even better if its author had ventured to be rather more concrete and a little less cautious. As it is, one feels that there is a trifle too much moral reasoning in the book—reasoning of a rather obvious and elaborate sort. The average reader goes out "by that same door wherein he went", but he is grateful for the formulation of the problem, for the facts and for the statement of authoritative general impressions that are as good as facts.

AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLITICS. By Herbert Adams Gibbons. New York: The Century Company.

It is rather unfortunate that Mr. Gibbons's dissertation sets out, like so

many books of its kind, as if it were going to be a mere compendium of the driest of dry facts. In truth, it is nothing of the sort; on the contrary it is one of the soundest and most illuminating treatises about international relations that have yet been written, though no especial brilliance of style or parade of conclusions signalizes this fact. The excellence of the author's point of view and general method may perhaps best be indicated by saying that no writer has more successfully than he digested his economic determinism. This doctrine makes him, as it were, cynical as regards the past, yet leaves him rationally hopeful. This is as it should be. The time has come when hardly anything seems more important than that we should be able to look back upon the war and upon the whole era preceding it without illusions.

Through the detailed account given in these pages one sees the game of world politics, influenced by the developments of the industrial era, for what it really is: "The science of government as practised in international relations, under the influence of real or fancied interests in other than neighboring countries or those with which relations of reciprocal advantage are naturally maintained." Its aim is "to enjoy, exclusively, the fruits of economic imperialism". As one reads this book, personal bias drops out of sight; specious claims and counterclaims, justifications, national aspirations, and even "ideals" are ironed out. The reason is that we are not merely comparing the relative justice of the policies of two nations or groups of nations, but are studying world politics as a whole; and though there is not a word of polemic in Mr. Gibbons's book, it is astonishing how wretched a business the facts make the whole system of world politics to have been.

The author is scrupulously just and quite unsparing. The question of Germany's special war guilt scarcely comes within his province. Not in justification of her provocation of the World War, but as a simple deduction from the facts, he writes: "In going to Tangier and in forcing the conference of Algeciras, Germany had laid down the principle that there must be equal opportunities for Germans in independent countries, and had demonstrated that she was prepared to enforce this principle. When one considers the remarkable growth in population and the industrial and maritime evolution, this attitude cannot be wondered at, much less condemned." However much we may prefer the Allied war aims to those of Germany, we must recognize that the understanding between Great Britain and France is not an idealistic arrangement. "The facts of Anglo-French relations prove that the Entente Cordiale is the result of a realization of common interests, which came when the statesmen of the two nations concluded that the prosperity and increasing power of Germany were more to be feared by both Great Britain and France than the prosperity and power of each were to be feared by the other." Even American participation in the World War "followed the great law of history, which is that peoples fight when they feel themselves menaced in their security and prosperity, and not until then". To say that the avowed motives—the vindication of principles of peace and justice against selfish autocratic power,

the fight for democracy, rights of small nations, and universal domination of right by consent of free peoples—to say that these were insincerely held or were not worth fighting for, or that they were wrongly invoked as motives for fighting against the Germans, would of course be utterly false. Yet the fact remains that “the Entente Powers had begun the war with the proclamation of those very principles almost three years earlier”. Either these principles were not deemed by the American people sufficiently important to fight for, or the nation and its leaders had as a whole been unaware that they were the issues at stake until the beginning of 1917.

What, then, of ideals? They have influence, but they are normally conditioned by economic conditions, and this is not a moral principle but a historic law. After the war we had a treaty which applied the high moral principles professed by the Allies to the defeated enemy, but did not make them binding upon the victors. There has been no improvement; there is not likely to be any until nations begin to recognize the folly of economic imperialism, to see that the game is not worth the candle. Now, thinks Mr. Gibbons, if Germany, excluded as she is from all participation in world politics, should nevertheless prove capable of again becoming a prosperous nation, the lesson would not be lost upon the other peoples of the world. Meanwhile the partial success of the Washington Conference is a cheering sign of the times.

Mr. Gibbons is far removed in spirit from those who hold that because there is necessarily a struggle for the survival of the fittest between nations as between individuals, therefore we should accept this fact as a sort of divine ordinance and play the brute game as brutally as possible. No, the right ought to prevail. The question is only of the way in which it can prevail in a human society governed by economic laws. We are, then, to be moral opportunists in a world the economic determinism of which we must fully realize.

This seems a reasonable point of view. At all events the conclusions which Mr. Gibbons reaches regarding the principal moot points—the significance of the Russian Revolution, the policies of President Wilson, the Treaty of Versailles—seem eminently sane, clear, and unhesitating.

THE CLASH. By Storm Jameson. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

It is not because one's national pride is offended by any false portraiture that one regards as absurd the putting forth of Storm Jameson's *The Clash* as a study in the conflict between the English and the American temperament. Doubtless there are some authentic British traits mixed up in the story. For all one knows, there may be real American traits in it, too. Traits common to both nations would seem, according to this picture, to be drunkenness, passion, foolish talk, and general immorality. But if there is anything distinctly national to be found in any of the persons Miss Jameson depicts, it is so obscured by sex, temperament, and general caprice as not to be distinguishable.

The Clash is a whirlwind of a story—no story at all. Of the plot, it is enough